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Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.: Antitrust
Standing Under Section 4; A Departure
From The Definitional Approach
"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."*
Benjamin Cardozo
I. Introduction
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co.' (Ostrofe), made a substantial change in its prac-
tice of deciding standing issues under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.2 Formerly, the Ninth Circuit employed the "target area"
test, which requires that the plaintiff, to have standing, be
"aimed at" as a member of the economy affected by the an-
ticompetitive practices.3 The Ostrofe court found the test an in-
adequate means for deciding standing issues and abandoned it.'
In its place the court established an analytical framework to bal-
* Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)
1. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982) (appeal pending).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The section states that.
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
Id. The section has been amended to provide for an award for interest if, under the
circumstances, 'such an award is just. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981). The constitutional
requirement of standing in antitrust cases is satisfied by alleging "injury to [one's] busi-
ness or property . . . ." Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust
Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 811 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Berger & Bernstein]. The
standing inquiry under section 4, however, requires "not only the fact of causation but
also the presence of legal causation." Id.
3. See Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951).
4. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1382. The Ostrofe court never expressly
states that the "target area" test is no longer the law in the jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the court's language implied so, stating: "The courts have devised various 'tests' for
standing to sue designed to limit the expansive liability that might flow from a literal
interpretation of the statute. While not without utility, these 'tests' have led to inconsis-
tent, and unpredictable results." Id.
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ance the policies underpinning section 4.5 Ostrofe held that an
employee, forced to resign6 for refusing to cooperate with his
employer's price fixing conspiracy, has standing to sue for treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.'
Ostrofe represents a significant development in antitrust
standing for two reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit is recognized
as being instrumental in the development of the widely used
"target area" test s that the court implicitly abandoned 9 in favor
of a balancing test.10 While the Ninth Circuit is not the first to
adopt a balancing test,1" the decision articulates the factors12 to
be considered and thus gives guidance to lower courts in their
attempt to employ the test. Second, by using the new test, the
court reached a conclusion that probably could not be achieved
under the "target area" test:13 that an employee has standing on
5. Id. at 1383. See infra text accompanying notes 105-10. Briefly, the Ostrofe court
stated that the policy in favor of enforcing the antitrust laws should be balanced against
the problem of vexatious litigation and excessive liability. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,
670 F.2d at 1383.
6. The complaint alleged that the defendant resigned from his position: "Ostrofe's
decision to resign from H.S. Crocker resulted from the threats of monetary reprisals
..... " Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, the circuit court of appeals treated Ostrofe as a "discharged"
employee. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1382 (emphasis added). This Note
will also refer to Ostrofe as a discharged employee.
7. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1386.
8. See Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292 (2d Cir. 1971) (landlord corporation of motion picture theatres denied standing to
sue motion picture distributors since the corporation was not itself a target of the alleged
anticompetitive conduct), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); see also Perry v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (appeal pending) (where the
court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's leadership in developing the "target area" test).
9. See supra note 6.
10. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383. Although the court does not spe-
cifically call the test a balancing test, the term will be used here for convenience.
11. The Third Circuit recently adopted an approach similar to that taken by the
Ostrofe court, and the court denotes it the "functional analysis" approach. Mid-West
Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
12. See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
The Third Circuit has been criticized for inadequately articulating the factors rele-
vant to standing determinations under their "functional analysis" approach. See Spitzer,
The Third Circuit's "Functional Analysis". Patrolling The Portals To Treble Damage
Actions Brought Under Section 4 of The Clayton Act, 21 B.C.L. REv. 659, 676 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Spitzer].
13. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380 (the district court held that Os-
trofe could not challenge the conspiracy to fix prices because he was not the "target" of
the scheme).
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the theory that the employer unilaterally discharged the em-
ployee as a means of effectuating the anticompetitive scheme.14
In making this determination, the court demonstrates how the
balancing test is applied to a particular factual matrix.1"
Part II of this Note presents the factual background of Os-
trofe, the legal background of section 4 standing inquiries, and
the procedural history of Ostrofe. Part III presents the majority
and dissenting opinions of the court of appeals decision. Part IV
critiques and analyzes these opinions. Part V explores the prac-
tical implications of the majority's balancing test. This Note
concludes that the circuits should follow Ostrofe since the deci-
sion promotes standing determinations that are in harmony with
the enforcement policies of the antitrust laws.
II. Background
A. The Facts
Frank J. Ostrofe is the former marketing director for H.S.
Crocker Co., a concern that manufactures paper lithograph la-
bels." Ostrofe's complaint 17 against Crocker alleged that Crock-
er and other unnamed manufacturers of labels conspired to un-
reasonably restrain interstate trade and commerce in labels" in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.19 According to Os-
trofe, the conspiracy was a "continuing agreement and concert
of action among the manufacturers to fix and maintain label
prices, submit rigged bids, allocate customers and territories,
and boycott those persons . . . who interfered . ..with their
illegal plans. 1 20 The scheme required Ostrofe to apprise compet-
itors of his employer's pricing decisions and protect the competi-
tors from price competition by Crocker.2
14. Id. at 1386.
15. Id. at 1383-86.
16. Id. at 1380.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, in pertinent partz
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States. . .is declared to be illegal." Id.
20. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380.
21. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1982).
1983]
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Ostrofe contended that he refused to cooperate with the
scheme.22 The complaint alleged that, in reaction to his refusal
to cooperate, executive officers at Crocker warned Ostrofe that
his opportunity for promotion and his bonus were made contin-
gent on his compliance with the scheme.2 3 Moreover, his superi-
ors warned Ostrofe that if he refused to cooperate, he would be
discharged and blacklisted from future employment in the labels
industry."' These threats allegedly forced Ostrofe to resign, and
he was subsequently barred from employment in the industry.2'
For this injury, Ostrofe invoked section 4 of the Clayton Act: a
remedial section that grants treble damages to successful private
litigants.'
B. Standing Under Section 4
1. The statute
Section 4 provides in pertinent part that, "[a]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue ... [for treble
damages]." 7 This section was deliberately drafted with sweep-
ing language to combat the threat that anticompetitive practices
pose." The expansive scope of this language, however, has
prompted the judiciary to limit the number of litigants entitled
to sue under section 4.' The courts iliaintain that the potency of
the treble damage remedy necessitates that some injuries go un-
redressed, 0 since any one antitrust violation can potentially af-
22. Ostrofe alleged that Crocker's coconspirators complained to Crocker's executive
officers when he refused to cooperate. The officers then attempted to coerce Ostrofe.
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380.
23. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1982).
24. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380.
25. Id.
26. Recall that section 4 also grants costs of the suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See supra note 2.
27. Id. see supra note 2.
28. See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2545 (1982). "[T]he
lack of restrictive language reflects Congress' 'expansive remedial purpose' in enacting §
4." Id.
29. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1382; Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v.
Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 1979).
30. See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Antitrust
[Vol. 3:739
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fect a multitude of individuals.3 1 The underlying rationale for
this limitation is that if the damage recoveries were so excessive
as to drive the violator out of business, the market concentration
would increase to the detriment of the beneficiaries of a compet-
itive market: competitors and consumers.2 Hence, overzealous
enforcement is equally hostile to the purpose of the antitrust
laws - to promote or maintain competition. 3
Accordingly, the initial inquiry focuses on whether a partic-
ular plaintiff has standing to sue under section 4. This prelimi-
nary requirement is more rigid than the constitutional threshold
that requires an individual to allege a "particular concrete in-
jury" to have standihg.'" The section 4 plaintiff must allege
"anti-trust injury"3 5 and legal causation. Factual causation alone
is not enough. The courts have established this stringent
standing requirement by interpreting the words "by reason of"
in section 4.37 The respective circuits have developed various
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1971).
31. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (finding the risk of duplicative
recovery unacceptable, the court would not grant standing to indirect purchasers, since
the plaintiff had probably passed on the amount of overcharge to its customers), reh'g
denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). For an economic analysis of the Illinois Brick decision see
Mantell, Denial of A Forum to Indirect-Purchaser Victims of Price Fixing Conspiracies:
A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 PAcE L. REv. 153 (1982). See gener-
ally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (denying standing to state whose
injury was allegedly inflicted on the general population and economy).
32. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 852.
33. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383. See also Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
34. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974). It is not enough to allege
the impact is "undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public.'" Id. at 176-
77 (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
35. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 489. See also Mid-
West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979) (interpret-
ing Brunswick as defining "antitrust injury").
36. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2 at 811.
Prosser states that, legal cause or "proximate cause" is merely the limitation which
the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his con-
duct. W. PRosszR, HANDBOOK or ma LAw OF Toms 236 (4th ed. 1971). He reasons that
"[in a philisophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity" and the
causes go back to the beginning of time. See id. Therefore, for pragmatic reasons "legal
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the
result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." Id. This
limitation is usually imposed for pure policy reasons. Id. at 237.
37. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 811; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 488.
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tests to cope with the inevitable linedrawing process characteris-
tic of standing inquiries.3 8 These tests can be grouped into three
definitional categories: the "direct injury" test, the "target area"
test, and the "zone of interests" test.39
2. "Direct injury" test
The determination under the "direct injury" test focuses on
whether the injury is too "remote" or "indirect" to be redressed
under section 4.40 If the injury flows directly from the violation,
then the plaintiff is granted standing. 1 The test emerged in the
context of corporate shareholders suing another corporation for
an alleged antitrust transgression. The courts held that the
shareholders lacked standing to sue for the diminished value of
their shares.42 The victimized corporation suffered the direct in-
jury, not the shareholders.4 3 A further illustration of an "indi-
rect" injury is the case where a landlord alleged injury as a re-
sult of a mortgage foreclosure caused by antitrust injuries
sustained by the landlord's tenant. The injury to the landlord
was found to be incidental and therefore the landlord lacked
standing."
38. See infra text accompanying notes 40-45, 59-62, 74-78. See generally Spitzer,
supra note 12.
39. See, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975)
("zone of interests" test); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481
F.2d 122 (9th Cir.) ("target area" test), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), reh'g denied,
414 U.S. 1148 (1974); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.) ("direct
injury" test), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938, reh'g denied, 412 U.S. 914, 945 (1973).
40. See Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 294-95 (2d Cir. 1958)
(where the shareholder had no standing to sue for conspiracy to cut off the corporation's
supply of films because his claim was "only derivative" from that injury). See also Pro-
ductive Inventions, Inc., v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
41. See, e.g., Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 508 (3d
Cir. 1976) (directness must be determined on a case by case basis); Harrison v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), afl'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
42. See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Ames v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
43. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. at 709-10; Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
166 F. at 822-24.
44. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), affd mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam).
45. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. at 390-91. The
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/17
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Commentators have criticized the "direct injury" test on
several grounds.46 The most pointed criticism is that the test is
difficult to apply.4 7 Courts have traditionally had difficulty draw-
ing the line between direct and indirect injuries."8 The question
is always one of degree. While some courts have suggested that
privity is necessary,4" others have rejected this approach.50 Fur-
thermore, some courts have confused causation in fact with cau-
sation in law.5 1 When this confusion occurs the inquiry becomes
a substantive one into the "injury" requirement of section 4, and
to determine that a plaintiff lacks the procedural requirement of
standing under the test is misleading.2 This is so because the
court is prejudging the merits of the plaintiff's claim whereas
standing determinations are intended to limit the number of liti-
gants for policy reasons."
Although the Third Circuit initially developed the "direct
injury" test,54 it has recently abandoned the test for a balancing
test analogous to the test developed by the Ostrofe court.55 The
direct injury test has been the dominant appoach to standing since the 1950s. Even the
"target area" test has been characterized as a "verbal variant" of the "direct injury" test,
since in practice most courts treat the "target area" rubric as a test for directness. See
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 818-19.
46. See, e.g., W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 224 (4th ed. 1971). See
sources cited infra notes 80-81.
47. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 819-20.
48. Id.
49. E.g., City and County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 636-38 (D.
Colo. 1971). See Beane, Antitrust: Standing & Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 331, 333
(1974) ("[If the victim and the perpetrator are separated by an intermediary party,
standing is usually denied to the claimant.").
50. See, e.g., FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 406 F. Supp. 224, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1097 (1977).
51. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 817-18 n. 32.
52. For instance, Judge Learned Hand found that the only relevant question under
section 4 was the factual existence of injury caused by an antitrust violation. See Vines
v. General Outdoor Adver. Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948); see, e.g., La Chapelle v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 90 F. Supp. 721, 722 (D. Mass. 1950); Westor Theatres, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757, 763 (D.N.J. 1941).
53. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
54. See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). See supra notes 40-
58 and accompanying text for discussion of the "direct injury" test.
55. Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir.
1979) ("functional analysis" approach); see also Bravman v. Bassett Furn. Indus., Inc.,
552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing standing inquiries as a balancing test com-
prised of many constant and variable factors), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1978).
19831
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circuit was dissatisfied with the limitations associated with the
"direct injury" test, since no test was capable of resolving all
standing problems.56 To meet this deficiency, the Third Circuit
formulated a policy-oriented "functional analysis" test.5 7 Simi-
larly, other jurisdictions have developed alternative tests in re-
sponse to the flaws inherent in the "direct injury" test.58
3. "Target area" test
To have standing under the "target area" test, the plaintiff
must be, as the metaphor suggests, the target of the antitrust
violation.59 When applying the "target area" test, the court es-
sentially asks whether the plaintiff was "aimed at" as a member
of that area of the economy which is endangered by a break-
down of competitive conditions in a particular industry."60 One
who is a bystander or incidentally injured by a violation cannot
recover. 1 In the strictest sense this means the victim, to be
within the "target area," must have been a competitor in the
defendant's industry." Thus, the landlord in the case used to
illustrate the "direct injury" test 63 would probably not have
standing. The tenant, as a competitor of the defendant, would
be the target of the violation. Yet the test is usually not applied
so restrictively as to require a victim to be the "bull's eye." The
victim need only have been aimed at with enough precision to be
56. See Bravman v. Bassett Furn. Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d at 99.
57. See Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d
Cir. 1979).
58. For a summary review of the various standing tests see Mantell, supra note 31,
at 157-65. See infra notes 39-45, 54-57, 74-78 and accompanying text.
59. See Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955).
60. Id. at 365.
61. See, e.g., Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.
1955) (standing denied to patent owner claiming derivative harm as a result of conspir-
acy directed against owner's licensees).
62. See, e.g., Campo v. National Football League, 334 F. Supp. 1181, 1186-87 (E.D.
La. 1971) (court considered target area to be industry in which defendant operated). But
see Bravman v. Bassett Furn. Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting a
"competitors only" rule since it would bar suits by victimized customers of price fixing
conspiracies), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1978). For customer's right to challenge
pricefixing conspiracies see, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1975).
63. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 3:739
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in the "target area."''
This test originated in the Ninth Circuit in Conference of
Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc.e5 The term "target area," however,
was not coined until later cases.66 Eventually the Ninth Circuit
injected the element of foreseeability to the test so that the vic-
tim must have been one the defendant should have reasonably
foreseen. 7 The Second Circuit still employs the "target area"
test," but absent the foreseeability element which it expressly
rejected as being too broad. 9 The circuit perceived foreseeabil-
ity in this context as overly comprehensive, since economic
repercussions in the line of distribution result from almost every
antitrust violation. 7
Commentators have criticized the Ninth Circuit's use of the
element of foreseeability on other grounds, arguing that its use
is theoretically unsound.71 The argument's proponents maintain
that all antitrust injuries are the result of the violator's inten-
64. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d at 365. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty
National Life Ins., Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
65. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951).
66. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955).
67. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.
1964); but cf. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th
Cir.) ("target area" test), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 1148
(1974).
68. See Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923, reh'g denied, 401
U.S. 1014 (1971).
69. Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d at 1296
n.2 (arguing that the "foreseeability" test would permit anyone to sue, regardless of how
distant his interest or relationship).
70. Id.
71. Berger and Bernstein state that "[t~he concept of foreseeability is arguably irrel-
evant, for all antitrust injuries are intentionally rather than negligently inflicted." Berger
& Bernstein, supra note 2, at 835. It is an established tort law principle that all injuries
resulting from intentional violations generate liability for all provable consequences. Id.
Professors Areeda and Turner have noted:
There is something to be said for excusing the defendant from damage liability for
injuries that he neither intended nor could reasonably foresee. The law of torts
often grants that excuse, and punitive treble damages create even more reason to
do so. . . . What is foreseeable or even intended is not necessarily appropriate for
antitrust protection.
AREEDA,& TURNER, II ANTrRUST LAW 165-66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA &
TURNER].
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tional acts." Tort law principles require that all provable in-
juries flowing from intentionally tortious conduct be redressed
whether or not the consequences were foreseeable. 3
4. "Zone of interests" test
The Sixth Circuit has formulated a standing test with many
of the attributes of the "target area" test but without the theo-
retically troublesome element of foreseeability74 The circuit uses
the "zone of interests" test which is an adaptation of an admin-
istrative law test.7 5 Similar to the "target area" test, the plaintiff
must be in the zone protected or regulated by section 4 and the
pertinent antitrust law allegedly violated (section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, for instance).7 Hence, the plaintiff must be in the zone
that the antitrust violation was intended to affect. The test dif-
fers from both the "target area" test and the "direct injury" test
in that it reserves the question of whether the plaintiff's injury
was "direct" as a factual issue to be determined on the merits.77
By postponing the "directness" issue, the circuit sought to avoid
what it perceived as the judiciary's use of earlier tests to deter-
mine the "merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the
standing of the claimant. '78
Critics note, however, that the "zone of interests" test im-
72. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 835. But see Austern, Dealing With Uncer-
tainties in How to Comply With the Antitrust Laws 367068 (Van Cise & Dunn eds.
1954) (noting that even experts find it difficult to advise clients with any degree of cer-
tainty whether the client's conduct will transgress lawful bounds).
73. The foreseeability element is also contrary to substantive antitrust law. See
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953) (harmful effect
of an antitrust violation on economic welfare is sufficient to give rise to antitrust
liability).
74. See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1145 (6th Cir. 1975); cf.
Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1234 (6th Cir. 1981) (modifying the test
in light of Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), to require that a
plaintiff plead "antitrust injury").
75. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d at 1151 (citing Association of Data
Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (two-prong test: plaintiff
must allege 1) injury in fact, and 2) interest sought to be protected by the complaint is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1150. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1389 n.1 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (noting similarities and differences between the "target area" test and the
"zone of interests" test).
78. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d at 1150 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 3:739
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properly introduces an administrative law test into antitrust
standing. They argue that administrative law rarely involves
damage awards whereas treble damages is the primary right
granted by section 4.79 The suggestion is that the lure of treble
damage awards requires thorough screening at the pretrial
stage. 0
5. Implementation: a problem
While the commentators cannot agree on which approach or
test works best, most agree that all of the tests suffer from the
way in which courts implement them.8 Over the years courts
applying these tests have shied away from analyzing the plain-
tiff's relationship to the antitrust violation.82 Instead, plaintiffs
have been "categorized" or "characterized" as coming within a
certain class of individuals who have been found either to have
or to lack standing.83 One observer noted that: "Problems of
characterization have reached their zenith in employee standing
cases. Standing determinations have often depended on whether
plaintiffs could be characterized as independent businessmen or
agents rather than as salaried employees of the defendants." 8"
79. Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act:
Determination of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 Am. U.L.
Rsv. 795, 806 (1976) (critique of test based on administrative law test established in
Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
80. The claimant in an administrative law suit, however, lacks the incentive of
treble damages to bring dubious or spurious claims. See generally id. at 806 n.50 (citing
In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 1148 (1974) for proposition that
courts are more inclined to grant injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act
than damages under section 4 because of the nature of the remedy.
81. See, e.g., Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2; Alioto & Donnici, Standing Require-
ments For Anti-Trust Plaintiffs: Judicially Created Exceptions to a Clear Statutory
Policy, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 205 (1970); Lytle & Purdue, supra note 79; Mantell, supra note
31, at 157-59. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
trust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1971).
82. See infra note 84.
83. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 820-29.
84. Id. at 821. See Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1975) (where the
court found a corporate officer qua employee has no standing), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir.) (holding that em-
ployees lack standing), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938, reh'g denied, 412 U.S. 914, 945 (1973);
cf. Bravman v. Bassett Fun. Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1977) (sales represen-
tative has standing); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 486-87 (5th Cir.
1983]
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Generally, employees constitute a category that lacks standing,5
and courts have decided the standing issue almost as a matter of
stare decisis.81 Traces of this are found in the fact that the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment upon Crocker's motion.
C. The District Court Decision
To appreciate the difference between the traditional "target
area" test and the balancing test that the majority adopts, one
must be familiar with the district court's treatment of Ostrofe's
complaint.8 7 The district court, in effect, split Ostrofe's com-
plaint into two "separate and unrelated" allegations: first, injury
caused by a conspiracy to fix prices and allocate territories; sec-
ond, a boycott of those who interfered with the conspiracy.88
As to the first allegation, the court found that Ostrofe, as an
employee, was not the "target" of the agreement to fix prices.8 9
Since Ostrofe was not a competitor or a consumer, the conspir-
1967) (sales employee has standing); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 420 (7th
Cir. 1942) (granting standing to employee sales agent); McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating
Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 460 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (manager paid by commission may
sue).
85. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 519-20 (7th Cir. 1982) (ap-
peal pending) (rejecting Ostrofe decision and finding salaried executive lacking standing;
injury indirectly caused by price fixing conspiracy); see also Callahan v. Scott Paper Co.,
541 F. Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (discharged employee who exposed conspiracy
lacks standing); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1982)
(appeal pending) (adopting Judge Kennedy's dissent in Ostrofe and denying former em-
ployee standing since it was indirect result of antitrust violation). But see International
Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass'n,
Inc., 483 F.2d 384, 394 (3d Cir. 1973) (recognizing employees right to standing),
amended, 494 F.2d 1353 (1974); Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 1974-1
Trade Cas. V 74,974 (CCH) (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corporate employee and guarantor of em-
ployer's obligations has standing), rev'd on other grounds, 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1976);
Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (dictum) (em-
ployees have standing if they have extraordinary skills).
86. See In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 519-20 (7th Cir. 1982)
(appeal pending): "Thus, as a general rule, stockholders, employees and creditors of an
injured company ... have all been denied recovery because their injuries were too 'indi-
rect', 'secondary', or 'remote'." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell,
518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975)). This language poignantly illustrates both the "cate-
gorization" and "characterization" problem.
87. The district court granted summary judgment without opinion. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals decision gives a synopsis of the lower court's treatment of Ostrofe's
claim. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380-81.
88. Id. at 1380-81.
89. Id. at 1380.
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acy was not "aimed at" him.90 The district court found his in-
jury was "an incidental effect" and therefore Ostrofe did not
have standing to attack the agreement.1 The district court did,
however, recognize Ostrofe's standing to challenge the "sepa-
rate" conspiracy: the agreement to boycott Ostrofe and others
who interfered with the scheme.2
Subsequently, Ostrofe moved to amend the complaint while
the summary judgment motion was pending on the boycott
claim. 3 The proposed amendment alleged a unilateral refusal by
Crocker to deal with Ostrofe as a means of effectuating the con-
spiracy.94 The district court rejected the amendment as an at-
tempt by Ostrofe to reallege the claim that he was adjudged to
lack standing to challenge. In reaching this decision, the court
found that Ostrofe would be required to show at trial the exis-
tence of such a conspiracy to prove that the unilateral action
was unlawful. 6 The court granted summary judgment to the de-
fendant.9 7 Thus, in applying the "target area" test, the district
court precluded Ostrofe from challenging both the overall con-
spiracy and the unilateral action taken by Crocker to carry out
the alleged scheme. 8
III. The Court of Appeals Decision
A. The Majority
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district
court erroneously fragmented Ostrofe's complaint.' 9 By frag-
menting the allegations, the plaintiff would have been denied
the benefit of the probative value of the interrelationship of the
90. Id. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1380-81.
94. Id. at 1381. This amendment to Ostrofe's complaint was the primary focus of
the court of appeals decision.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 87.
98. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380-81.
99. Id. at 1381. "It is axiomatic that the allegations of a complaint must 'be read as
a whole, and. . . viewed broadly and liberally.' "Id. (quoting C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 5
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1363, at 657 (1969)). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957).
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claims.100 Without being able to prove the existence of the con-
spiracy at trial, Ostrofe could not effectively prove the
boycott.101
Before addressing the question presented by the theory em-
bodied in Ostrofe's proposed amendment, the court noted that
the boycott, by itself, was a violation of the Sherman Act. 02 For
this reason alone, Ostrofe had standing. His claim was regarded
as "indistinguishable"103 from Radovich v. National Football
League"'0 where the Supreme Court granted standing. Having
laid this foundation, the court proceeded to articulate the Ninth
Circuit's new balancing test for deciding standing issues under
section 4.
The majority stated that, to determine standing, the court
should focus on balancing two competing policies: the enforce-
ment of antitrust laws versus the avoidance of vexatious litiga-
tion and excessive liability. 0 5 The rationale for focusing on these
policies is also twofold. First, the primary purpose for granting
treble damages under section 4 is that the potential magnitude
of an award serves to deter antitrust violations.' 06 Hence, the ex-
tent to which a plaintiff's action will further the enforcement
purpose of section 4 should be central to the determination of
standing. 07 Second, if the plaintiff is one of a class whose mem-
bers are so numerous that granting standing would enlarge "the
100. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1381.
101. See id.
102. Id. The court was apparently referring to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
103. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1382 (citing Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (Radovich)).
104. 352 U.S. 445 (1957). In Radovich, the plaintiff was a professional football
player. He alleged that the defendants conspired to monopolize and control professional
football in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff's contention
was that a part of the conspiracy consisted of a scheme to destroy a competitive league,
the All-American Conference, by boycotting it and its players. Radovich was a player for
the competitor. This scheme was allegedly accomplished by boycotting and blacklisting
players who had violated contracts that prohibited players from signing with another
team without the consent of the team holding the contract. The Radovich Court granted
standing to the plaintiff football player to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act for the
alleged injuries sustained as a result of the plaintiff being the subject of a boycott. See
id. at 454.
105. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383.
106. Id. (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968)).
107. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383.
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private weapon to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by
Congress" then standing should be denied.108 The Ostrofe court
reduced these two interests to eight factors. 0 9 The court indi-
cated that each factor should be considered individually in rela-
tion to the aggregate (policies) to determine whether standing
should be granted."0
1. Factors in favor of granting standing
In analyzing Ostrofe's allegation that Crocker unilaterally
discharged him as a means of effectuating the conspiracy, the
majority focused on whether Ostrofe would be an effective en-
forcer of the antitrust laws."' The court proceeded on the pre-
mise that conspiracies in restraint of trade are commonly covert,
and therefore go undetected." 2 From this premise, the court rea-
soned that exposure may depend on insider information. 13
Without adequate incentive, insiders (employees) are reluctant
to disclose the scheme, since it would almost surely mean losing
their jobs." 4 The court noted that the threat of criminal sanc-
tion for participating in the scheme is an insufficient incentive,
because the chances that the scheme will be detected are slim." 5
Therefore, the court concluded that the possibility of recovering
treble damages presents the only real incentive to employees to
resist the unlawful scheme and to bring it to the attention of
108. Id. (quoting Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
454 F.2d at 1295).
109. See infra text accompanying note 124 for a list of the eight factors.
110. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383-86.
111. See id. at 1384-85. The positive factors the court considers are more variable in
nature than the countervailing factors in that they are tailored to the factual makeup
presented by the particular plaintiff seeking standing. The focus is on how the plaintiff is
suited to be an effective enforcer, or, conversely, why the plaintiff lacks the attributes of
an antitrust enforcer. See id.
112. Id. at 1384. It has been noted that "the detection rate of antitrust violations is
much lower than that of other crimes because an antitrust violation 'is usually a con-
cealed crime and there is rarely an identifiable victim who is aware of the violation.'"
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 847 n.172 (quoting Statement before the Tenth
New England Antitrust Conference, Nov. 20, 1976, reprinted in 790 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (1976)).
113. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1384.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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authorities."1 '
Furthermore, discharging those who refuse to participate is
a necessary element of every successful scheme. 11 7 Thus, accord-
ing to the court, granting standing to such persons serves a dual
purpose. First, it enhances potential liability for the conduct
conspiring businesses must engage in to carry out the scheme." s
Second, the early detection afforded by giving the remedy to dis-
charged employees may mitigate the damage that would have
otherwise occurred.11 9 Disclosing the scheme at its inception
reduces the injury to the consumer and minimizes damage to the
competitive structure of the market. 120 Without further explana-
tion, the majority also noted that the discharged employee's in-
jury flows "immediately, not remotely or indirectly" and hence,
he is a "proximate victim."' 21
2. Factors counseling denial of standing
Concluding that the above reasons support a strong basis
for granting standing,122 the majority then considered the coun-
tervailing factors that counsel denial of standing. 28 The court
listed eight factors that should be considered in this respect.
These factors are:
i. whether the number of persons that comprise the plaintiff's
class are so numerous that granting standing would produce a
"flood of litigation;" or
ii. whether their claims would impose a ruinous financial burden
on the industry; or
iii. whether the plaintiffs damages would be duplicative in that
a) the plaintiff could essentially recover twice for the same in-
jury, and b) the damages are "passed on" to others; or
116. Id.
117. The court stated that "[n]o conspiracy to fix prices and allocate customers can
be effective without the cooperation of responsible employees of each competitor." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1384-85. '[Oince destroyed, competitive conditions may be difficult to
restore." Id. at 1385.
121. Id. at 1385. For a discussion of this language see infra text accompanying notes
208-14.
122. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
123. Id.
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iv. whether treble damages would, under the circumstances,
constitute an unfair penalty imposed on an unwary defen-
dant; or
v. whether assessing damages would be unduly speculative; or
vi. whether treble damages would be a "windfall" to the plain-
tiff; or
vii. whether the damage is indirectly related to the violation; or
viii. whether the remedial purpose for allowing three times the
actual loss is not satisfied." 4
The majority concluded that none of these factors were present
in Ostrofe's case.12
3. Brunswick
Having reached the conclusion that none of the counter-
vailing factors precluded suit by Ostrofe, the majority was con-
strained to address the Supreme Court ruling in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc."' (Brunswick). In a separate
portion of the opinion the majority proffered several reasons
why the Brunswick decision did not require denying standing to
Ostrofe. 117 Becuase the interpretation given to the language in
Brunswick is crucial to whether Ostrofe has or lacks standing, a
synopsis of the facts and reasoning of that case is necessary. 12
The plaintiffs in Brunswick were operators of bowling cen-
ters that were owned by another concern.22 The defendant, one
of the two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment in the
United States, acquired and operated a number of bowling cen-
ters. 30 Each acquired center had been indebted to defendant
manufacturer as a result of equipment sold on credit."'3 These
acquisitions were an attempt to mitigate losses accruing from
124. Id. at 1385-86.
125. Id. at 1386.
126. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
127. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1386-88.
128. The majority and the dissent sharply disagree on the proper construction of
Brunswick. Compare id., infra notes 152-68 and accompanying text, with id. at 1389-91
(Kennedy, J., dissenting), infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
129. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 479.
130. Id. at 479-80.
131. Id.
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the defaulting centers' inability to make payments as a result of
a sharp decline in the industry.' Six of these acquired centers
were located in the market in which the plaintiffs operated.133
The plaintiffs claimed treble damages under section 4 on
the grounds that the acquisitions might substantially lessen
competition in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.134 The
plaintiffs' theory was that had the defendant not acquired the
defaulting bowling centers, the defaulting centers would have
closed. 135 By acquiring the centers, the defendants deprived the
plaintiffs of a larger portion of the market and the increased
profits they would have realized had the defaulting centers
failed. 1 3
In construing the plaintiffs' complaint with respect to sec-
tion 4, the unanimous Court rejected this theory and denied
standing to the plaintiffs.'3 7 The Court declined to adopt any of
the standing tests used by the various circuits.'3 8 Instead the
Court reached this conclsion by interpreting the words "injury"
and "by reason of" in section 4,139 the words traditionally inter-
preted as embodying the standing requirement.'4 0 The Court
noted that Congress has condemned mergers only when they
might produce anticompetitive effects."4 Yet here the defen-
dant's actions served to maintain or increase competition." 2 Ac-
cording to the Court the very reason why the plaintiffs claimed
injury was that defendant's acquisitions increased competition,
thereby depriving them of expected profits."13 The Court stated
132. Id.
133. Id. at 480 (the plaintiffs were located in three markets: Pueblo, Colo., Pough-
keepsie, N.Y., and Paramus, N.J.).
134. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (proscribing acquisitions where the "effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen, or to tend to create a monopoly").
135. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 481.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 488.
138. See id. at 485-87; see also Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540,
2547 n.12 (1982) (where the Court declined to "evaluate the relative utility" of the vari-
ous standing tests).
139. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 488. See supra note 2
for the text of section 4.
140. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 810-11.
141. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 487.
142. Id. at 488.
143. Id.
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that "it is far from clear that the loss of windfall profits . . .
even constitutes 'injury' within the meaning of [section] 4 144
and if injury did occur, it was not "by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws. 1 45 Accordingly, the Court found the
plaintiffs lacked standing.'46
The precise language in the Brunswick decision that has
captured the attention of the circuit courts is: "Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the an-
titrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful. 1 47 Prior to Ostrofe, the
Ninth Circuit had interpreted this language to mean that anti-
trust laws are aimed at protecting competition and that the in-
jury must reflect the "anticompetitive effect" of the violation. 4 8
The Ostrofe majority declined to follow these earlier
interpretations.1 49
Instead the court chose to distinguish Brunswick on several
grounds. 150 First, the court indicated that Brunswick, unlike Os-
trofe, concerned a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.' 5'
Ostrofe alleged a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,15 2
and thus the majority argued, the relevance of Brunswick is
"unclear.' 53 On this point, the court seemed to intimate that
the substantive antitrust statute sued upon might somehow af-
fect the standing determination under section 4. Furthermore,
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 489.
147. Id.
148. See Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1978)
(citing Brunswick for proposition that "injury caused by the violation must be one the
antitrust laws were designed to protect against"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979). See
also John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 498-500 (9th Cir. 1977)
(discussing Brunswick).
149. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387 n.24 and accompanying text
(acknowledging prior interpretations of Brunswick in the circuit as having read the case
as limiting standing to damages caused by the anticompetitive effects of violation).
150. See id. at 1386-88.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), supra note 134. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at
1386.
Note, however, that the complaint in Brunswick also alleged violations of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 480-
81 n.3.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See supra note 19 for text of statute.
153. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1386.
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the court wrote that "the distinction between the concepts of
standing and antitrust injury" is also uncertain. 54 This state-
ment refers to the practice of some courts interpreting Bruns-
wick as defining "antitrust injury," not the perimeters of stand-
ing. 155 Notwithstanding these doubts, the majority acknowledged
that lower courts have interpreted Brunswick as limiting stand-
ing to those whose injury was "caused by the anti-competitive
effect" of the violation, thus precluding suit by plaintiffs in Os-
trofe's position.'56 Since Ostrofe alleged that Crocker's unilateral
conduct was the means, not the effect, of carrying out the
scheme, such an interpretation of Brunswick would bar Ostrofe's
suit on the theory embodied in Ostrofe's amended complaint. 15
The majority, however, deemed such a narrow construction
"[un]justified,"5' and went on to explain what it perceived as
the central theme of Brunswick.15 9
The majority maintained that Brunswick stands for the
proposition that "to be actionable under section 4, plaintiff's in-
jury should fall within the core of Congressional concern under-
lying the substantive provision of the antitrust laws . . .,.
From the fact that Congress imposed criminal liability upon vio-
lators of the Sherman Act,161 even though they may be acting in
154. Id.
155. Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d at 582.
156. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis added).
The majority stated:
Brunswick could be read as limiting Section 4 to suits for damages caused by the
anticompetitive effect of the particular antitrust violation. Similar language ap-
pears in lower court opinions. So construed, Brunswick arguably would prevent
suit by Ostrofe if his injury resulted only from unilateral conduct by Crocker in
furtherance of the conspiracy rather than from the elimination of competition in
the marketing of Ostrofe's services or in the marketing of labels.
Id. (citing GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 758 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Mul-
tidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d at 127; Conference of Studio
Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d at 54).
157. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
158. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387.
The court's note states that, "[e]ven under this construction, Brunswick would not
bar recovery of treble damages for injuries sustained by Ostrofe from the alleged boycott,
since such injuries would result directly from the elimination of competition in the mar-
keting of Ostrofe's services." Id. at 1387 n.24.
159. Id. at 1387.
160. Id.
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), supra note 19.
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a representative capacity, the majority inferred that Congress
was concerned with more than merely maintaining competitive
conditions."6 2 It argued that "Congress was also concerned with
the conduct of individuals acting on behalf of conspiring eco-
nomic entities."1 3 Since Ostrofe was injured by trying to comply
with the mandates of the Sherman Act, he "suffered an 'anti-
trust injury . . . of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent.' 16, Thus, the requirement of "antitrust injury," as de-
fined in Brunswick,166 was not a barrier to granting Ostrofe
standing.
B. The Dissent
The dissent criticized the majority for ignoring controlling
precedent in the circuit 66 and for misconstruing the Supreme
Court's ruling in Brunswick. 7 Judge Kennedy argued that
Brunswick has been clearly interpreted in the circuit as limiting
standing to "persons injured as competitors in a defined market
or in a discrete area of the economy. ' ' ss
Furthermore, the dissent urged that by implicitly discarding
the "target area" test, the majority had disregarded precedent in
which the court "emphatically re-embraced the target area the-
ory." 6  Judge Kennedy argued that the test envisages a balanc-
162. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387-88.
163. Id. at 1387.
164. Id. at 1388 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at
489).
165. The Third Circuit includes the "definition of antitrust injury" from Brunswick
as a factor in its "functional analysis" test. See Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continen-
tal Group, Inc., 596 F.2d at 582.
Justice Brennan, when addressing the importance the circuit courts have placed on
this language in Brunswick, noted: "Brunswick is not so limiting. . . . Thus while an
increase in price resulting from a dampening of competitive market forces is assuredly
one type of injury for which § 4 potentially offers redress. . . that is not the only form of
injury remedial under § 4." Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2550.
166. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing,
e.g., John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d at 498-500 which discusses and
applies the Brunswick analysis).
167. Id. at 1389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Implicit in this line of argu-
ment is the accusation that the majority's decision runs contrary to the doctrine of stare
decisis.
169. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973), reh'g denied,
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ing of policy interests"' and encompasses Brunswick's require-
ment that "the injury flow[] from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful."1"1 Applying the test to Ostrofe, the dissent found
that he was not injured by the labels industry breakdown, but
that his injury was merely collateral. 172 Hence, according to the
dissent, Ostrofe was outside the target area.17"
The dissent further found that Ostrofe did not have stand-
ing to challenge the boycott.1 74 The dissent offered two alterna-
tive arguments in support of this position. First, the majority
misplaced its reliance on Radovich v. National Football
league17  (Radovich) because Ostrofe's discharge was coercion
apart from the main scheme.17 6 Unlike Radovich, the boycott
against Ostrofe, the dissent contended, was not "the same type
as, and a part of, the larger conspiracy. ' 17 7 Second, the dissent
viewed Ostrofe's failure to produce evidence in support of the
boycott charge, independent of the conspiracy, as determina-
tive.17 8 Therefore, according to Judge Kennedy, the district
court properly granted summary judgment. 17 9
Finally, the dissent did not perceive this denial of standing
as a harsh result in this case,180 since Ostrofe had alternative
remedies under state law.1 81 Therefore, Judge Kennedy main-
414 U.S. 1148 (1974)).
170. Id. at 1390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 147.
172. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1390-91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175. 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See supra note 104 for discussion of the Radovich
decision.
176. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Recall that the majority argued that Ostrofe's case is indistinguishible from
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See supra note 104 and ac-
companying text.
177. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that Ostrofe did not
show ostracism after his resignation. Id.
179. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Judge Kennedy points out that California (located within the Ninth Circuit)
has recognized the right of an at-will employee to sue for wrongful discharge on a breach
of contract theory or tort action when the employee is discharged for refusing to perform
an unlawful act. Id. (citing Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)). See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Hasv. L. REv. 1816
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tained, Ostrofe can seek compensatory relief and punitive dam-
ages without overextending the reach of federal antitrust laws. l8 '
IV. Analysis
A. The Majority
1. Relevant factors
In summary, the majority identified the relevant competing
policy interests and applied them to Ostrofe's claim.18 3 The ma-
jority was concerned that the plaintiff, to be entitled to stand-
ing, represent an effective private enforcer of the antitrust laws.
The court concluded that Ostrofe was worthy of fulfilling this
role.'" Against this factor in favor of granting standing, the ma-
jority considered the possibility that countervailing, negative
factors were present, indicating that standing should be de-
nied. 5 The court considered eight factors'86 and found none of
these countervailing factors present in Ostrofe's case.
While the majority's articulation of the various factors is ex-
emplary, 8 7 the Court's conclusory treatment of them is subject
to criticism. Balancing is usually accompanied by close analy-
sis,1s yet the majority merely makes mention of some of these
factors and negates their presence in the instant case. 89
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Protecting At Will Employees].
182. The dissent argued that the majority's decision is indicative of a trend in the
federal courts where, in the name of antitrust deterrence, the federal courts overextend
their jurisdiction and threaten federalism. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at
1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 105-25.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 111-20.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
187. The Third Circuit has been criticized for inadequately defining the factors to
be considered in the "functional analysis" test promulgated in Mid-West Paper Prods.
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979). Spitzer, supra note 12, at
676.
188. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., No. 81-
1203, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 23, 1983) (available Mar. 8, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Sup file) (where the Court stated, "[t]he decision . . .does not rest on a mechanical
checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors .... ." Id. See also Colo-
rado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1976) (noting that
no one factor should be determinative in balancing and that a carefully considered judg-
ment should take into account several factors).
189. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385-86.
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Although some of the factors listed are superfluous or re-
dundant, as is suggested by their cursory treatment,9 0 others are
important countervailing factors that require careful scrutiny.
Of the court's list of eight countervailing factors, three should be
considered of primary importance. The danger that the plaintiff
is a member of a large class of plaintiffs speaks to the problem
of allowing multiple claimants to recover judgments that would
be trebled. By satisfying these judgments the defendant might
be driven out of business, thus decreasing competition - and
flouting the purpose of the antitrust laws. Such a result is the
rationale underlying the second important factor: that the plain-
tiff's claims would impose a ruinous financial burden on the in-
dustry. This would occur where many discrete but nonduplica-
tive treble damage recoveries would aggregate to bankrupt the
defendant."'1 Finally, courts should be quick to deny standing
where the recovery would be duplicative." e2
a. Numerous plaintiffs
In considering the first factor, the court's analysis began:
"Employees discharged by their employers for declining to take
part in an anti-trust violation are not so numerous that recogniz-
ing their claims would threaten a flood of litigation ....
This conclusion, however, is unsubstantiated. Since Ostrofe is
the only employee alleging misconduct against his employer in
this instance, perhaps the conclusion is justified here. Neverthe-
less, it is conceivable that Ostrofe is not the only employee in-
jured by the acts of the allegedly conspiring corporations."94
190. Among the lesser considerations are the extent that the plaintiff's damages
would be "speculative" and the possibility that the defendant is "unwary" of the viola-
tion he has committed. Both are accorded, however, a separate paragraph. See Ostrofe v.
H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385. Cf. supra note 201.
191. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 851.
192. See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (pass-on doctrine),
reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). See supra note 31.
193. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
194. See generally California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Con-
tractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (standing denied where carpenter
union brought action alleging association had conspired to coerce owners of property to
hire contractors who were not signatories to collective bargaining agreement); Bubar v.
Ampco Foods, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 535 (D. Idaho 1982) (five former employees denied
standing).
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Stated in terms of a general proposition the court's conclusion
becomes even more questionable. The majority should have of-
fered some basis for their conclusion or narrowed their finding
(and language) to the facts presented by the instant case.
b. Financial ruin
In its decision, the majority frequently cited an article writ-
ten by Berger and Bernstein,195 where the authors advocate an
approach similar to that adopted by the Ostrofe court. In setting
forth their model, the authors propose that of all the counter-
vailing factors, the court should consider the policy against "ru-
inous recovery" or "overkill" the most important.1" Neverthe-
less, the majority merely concluded that granting employees
standing would not be a ruinous financial burden without fur-
ther explanation.'" More attention is afforded the prospect that
Ostrofe's damages would be "speculative. '"1 98 When addressing
this factor, the majority reasoned that courts are accustomed to
assessing damages in cases of wrongful discharge.'" Berger and
Bernstein, however, argue that the "speculative" factor should
play no part in the standing determination.2"
c. Duplicative recovery
Similarly, when addressing the duplicative recovery factor
the court summarily decided that granting standing would not
result in a duplicative recovery.10' The court correctly consid-
ered both prongs of this factor: that plaintiff might recover twice
for the same injury and, that plaintiff might pass on the dam-
195. The frequent citation to, and similarity in language and approach to the Berger
and Bernstein article, supra note 2, strongly suggests that the Ostrofe court used the
authors' suggested approach as the prototype for their balancing test. This inference is
bolstered by the fact that the authors used employee plaintiffs to illustrate the disparate
treatment accorded similarly situated plaintiffs seeking standing.
196. Id. at 850-52.
197. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
198. See supra note 187.
199. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
200. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 854-55.
201. The duplicative recovery, possibility of plaintiffs passing on their injuries, and
ruinous recovery factors are all treated in one short paragraph, indicating the lack of
analysis. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
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ages or include them in the losses of others.20 2 The court stated:
"The damages done to such an employee are done to him alone;
the damages he sustains are not passed on . . .". Again, it
would seem the conclusions are sound, yet to dispense with this
important factor without setting out the reasons for the conclu-
sion sets a poor example for the lower courts who will need guid-
ance in applying the majority's balancing test.
2. The court's attention to less significant factors
Juxtaposed to these three important countervailing factors
are the factors that require only passing attention in most cases.
Among these lesser considerations is the possibility that the an-
titrust violator is an unwary defendant undeserving of a treble
damage penalty." " Antitrust infractions are perceived as inten-
tional acts and as such, a defendant cannot be heard to com-
plain that he was "unwary. '20 5 The "windfall" factor should also
command relatively little attention.20 6 A plaintiff receiving a
"windfall" from his efforts to enforce the antitrust laws is, nev-
ertheless, a private enforcer who ultimately acts in society's best
interests. Without enforcement the antitrust laws lose their effi-
cacy, and therefore the "windfall" is the transgressor's expense
and society's gain. Nevertheless, the court pays considerable at-
tention to some of the lesser factors to the detriment of the
more important ones, which is especially disturbing in light of
the Berger and Bernstein model on which the court seemed to
base its analysis.2 7
3. Remoteness
A puzzling aspect of the majority opinion is the court's ref-
erence to "remoteness." The court stated that a discharged em-
ployee's injury flows "immediately, not remotely or indi-
rectly."20 8 This language is the language of the "target area" test
202. See supra note 192.
203. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
204. See supra note 190.
205. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
206. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 854.
207. See supra note 195.
208. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
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and the "direct injury" test.2 09 One wonders what role these in-
dicia of the definitional tests will play in the new balancing test.
The court may be indicating that the "remoteness" of the injury
is merely one factor in the overall consideration, but this re-
mains unclear.
Under the Berger and Bernstein analysis, the court's consid-
eration of the "remoteness" of Ostrofe's injury is also misplaced.
The authors take the position that if the court concludes that no
countervailing policies are implicated, as the Ostrofe court has,
"the court should grant standing no matter how 'remote' the
alleged injury. ' " The rationale is that the victim should be
compensated whether his injury is "remote," inside or outside a
"target area.""' As noted with respect to the "windfall" factor,
the deterrence policy also supports this conclusion. A "remote"
enforcer is better than none.21'
The court's characterization of Ostrofe as a "proximate vic-
tim" is as perplexing as its reference to "remoteness.' ' s This
"proximate" language might imply that the circuit intends to re-
tain the element of foreseeability as a factor to be weighed in the
standing determination. This could be viewed as a regression to
the theoretically unsound use of foreseeability,2" but the signifi-
cance of this language is unclear. Perhaps subsequent cases will
clarify the court's posture on the foreseeability element.
4. Brunswick
By addressing the Brunswick decision separately, the court
fell victim to the evil that the balancing test was designed to
209. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 59-61.
210. Thus, Ostrofe comes within Berger and Bernstein's Rule 1 of the authors' four-
rule "Framework of Rules for Implementation and Accommodation." Berger & Bern-
stein, supra note 2, at 858. Rule 1 states:
Where no countervailing policy against a particular plaintiff's antitrust action is
implicated, the court should grant standing no matter how "remote" the alleged
injury. This rule essentially provides that standing to obtain private antitrust re-
lief shall, wherever possible, be coextensive with the substantive protection of the
antitrust laws.
Id. at 860.
211. Id. at 860.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07.
213. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1385.
214. See supra note 71.
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eliminate: attenuated distinctions and arguments that lose sight
of the underlying purpose of section 4. It would have been suffi-
cient to point out that "[tihe language of Brunswick must be
read in light of the problem to which it was directed,"2 15 and
distinguish the case on factual grounds.21' The Brunswick Court
was faced with a plaintiff claiming injury from the defendant's
actions that tended to maintain or increase competition. 17 The
defendant's acquisitions rescued the failing bowling centers from
collapse and thereby maintained the competitive conditions in
the plaintiffs' market."" Ostrofe, on the other hand, alleged a
conspiracy which had as its purpose the elimination of competi-
tion in the labels industry.21 9 Such a conspiracy is not "inimical"
to the antitrust laws.20
In failing to distinguish Brunswick on factual grounds, the
majority resorted to unsound reasoning. It simply does not fol-
low that because Congress imposed criminal sanctions on viola-
tors that persons refusing to violate the law were "intended" to
be protected in this sense."' Criminal penalties are imposed to
deter conduct that is contrary to society's interests. Society is
the object of the protection, not the individual citizen (Ostrofe)
who complies with the law. Thus, the court's argument attempt-
ing to put Ostrofe within the "core of congressional concern"
fails. This flaw could have been avoided had the court merely
included Brunswick's requirement of "antitrust injury" as just
one of the many factors to be considered, as is the practice in
the Third Circuit.2"'
5. Prior antitrust litigation
Finally, while the majority made reference to litigation in-
volving Crocker,"s the court failed to point out its significance.
215. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1387.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 129-36.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
219. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
220. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 488.
221. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1388.
222. See, e.g., Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573
(3d Cir. 1979) ("functional analysis" test).
223. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1380 n.1. The court merely cites the
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In the prior litigation Crocker, and several other manufacturers
of paper labels, agreed to a stipulated judgment.2' The judg-
ment required Crocker to take affirmative action to ensure that
its officers and employees did not engage in conduct in violation
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Although the judgment
does not constitute an admission of guilt,2 5 it suggests that the
government suspected Crocker of anticompetitive practices, but
lacked the resources to carry out the investigation and litigation.
This illustrates the need for private enforcement, since the gov-
ernment does not have the means or resources to pursue all anti-
trust violations. 26 Ostrofe, as a private enforcer, is capable of
filling this gap in the enforcement scheme.
B. The Dissent
The dissent's position draws most of its strength from the
doctrine of stare decisis.227 No one would question that the "tar-
get area" test was the rule in the jurisdiction prior to Ostrofe.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has highlighted the test's flaws
and limitations in dictum in a recent decision."6 There the court
prior litigation in which the defendnt's name appears. See United States v. H.S. Crocker
Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 61,883 (CCH) (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. H.S. Crocker
Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 1 60,615 (CCH) (N.D. Cal. 1975).
224. The Compliance section of the opinion states:
Defendant shall take affirmative steps... to advise each of its officers, directors,
managing agents and employees... of its and their obligations under this Final
Judgment and of the criminal penalties for violation of Section IV of this Final
Judgment. [Defendant] shall ... cause a copy of this Final Judgment to be dis-
tributed at least one each year to each of its officers ....
United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 1 61,883, 73,703 (CCH) (N.D. Cal.
1976).
225. Id. The opinion stated that "this Final Judgment [does not] constitut[e] any
evidence against or admission by any party with respect to any issue of fact or law.
Id. at 73,702.
226. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 848-49.
227. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
228. See California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of
California, Inc., 648 F.2d at 538 n.18, where the court wrote:
We note with approval, however, that the zone of interests approach appears to
embody a fundamental concern for the policies underlying the antitrust laws and
Congress's purpose in creating a private antitrust damage action. That purpose
appears to have been twofold:
1) to provide a meaningful compensatory remedy for private harm, and
2) to provide effective enforcement and deterrence by encouraging private
parties to bring some of the suits not brought by the government.
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wrote, "[w]e therefore suggest that, in future cases, parties who
would be denied standing because they were not 'foreseeable vic-
tims' under the traditional target area test should still be per-
mitted to litigate their claims if to do so would further the poli-
cies underlying the antitrust laws. 229 This clearly adumbrates
the circuit's willingness to depart from the "target area" test to
give effect to the policies underpinning section 4. The dissent
seemed to lose sight of the fact that the purpose of section 4 is
to see that the antitrust laws are enforced. For Judge Kennedy,
it was enough that precedent has been established and the
plaintiff does not fall within the "target area." He was unmoved
by the fact that without Ostrofe as an enforcer, the violation
may continue unchecked.
Perhaps the most critical flaw in Judge Kennedy's dissent,
however, is that it fails to address or find fault with the major-
ity's balancing test. The dissent did not advance any reason why
the balancing test will prove inferior to the "target area" test.
All of Judge Kennedy's arguments attacked the results achieved
by applying the test and not the test itself.
V. Evaluation
The majority's case by case approach to standing under sec-
tion 4 recognized that the standing inquiry should focus on bal-
ancing the policies in favor of private enforcement of the anti-
trust laws against the concern that granting standing will subject
the violator to economic ruin.2 3 0 The court articulated the fac-
tors a lower court should consider in making its determination
and, in doing so, established an administrable test for the courts
to apply.2" With its emphasis on balancing factors and analyz-
ing facts, the test eliminates both unwarranted attention on
catch words and pharases (e.g., "target," "direct") and the prob-
lem of "categorization." The result is a manageable analytical
Id.
229. Id.
230. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1383 (citing Comment, Standing
To Sue For Treble Damages Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act, 64 Colum. L. Rev.
570, 571 (1964)).
231. But cf. supra text accompanying notes 193-95, 201-03 (the test is adminis-
trable, yet the Ostrofe court's analysis and application of the factors to the facts
presented was conclusory and inadequate).
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framework designed to foster the policy of antitrust
enforcement.
Furthermore, this approach may eliminate some of the un-
predictability associated with standing under the "target area"
test. Formerly, a prospective plaintiff would have to indulge in
highly conceptual guesswork to determine whether his injury
was foreseeable and within the "target" of the conspiracy. The
litigant risked protracted litigation on uncertain prospects
merely to establish standing. While the balancing test offers no
"bright line" answers, the prospective plaintiff can weigh the
factors to determine whether or not he has standing. This
should lend predictability to the determination, serving to en-
courage litigants to pursue their suits only when the factors are
in their favor. The test, therefore, represents a sound approach
in an area of law where judicial discretion is a necessity.
This test, if adopted in other jurisdictions, would also pro-
vide the discharged employee a remedy in jurisdictions where
none exists under state law 32 and perhaps, more importantly,
create an effective private enforcement mechanism that arrests
the evil before substantial damage is done. Recognizing an em-
ployee's standing to sue would create a remedy for those dis-
charged as a means of implementing and effectuating the an-
ticompetitive scheme. The recovery would not depend on
whether a state recognizes a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge and thus the remedy and deterrence would be uniform.
The threat of treble damage awards would discourage employers
from risking participation in anticompetitive conduct and thus
enhance deterrence. The incentive to the employee not to coop-
erate also means the scheme will be frustrated at its inception
and afford timely disclosure to the public. Early detection by an
employee who "blows the whistle" after being discharged will
mitigate the harm to the competitive market structure and re-
duce the period of inflated prices paid by the consumer.
VI. Conclusion
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co. is an important departure from
232. See Protecting At Will Empoyees, supra note 181, at 1822 (only California,
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Oregon, and West Virginia recognize the cause of action for
wrongful discharge).
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the definitional "target area" test in favor of a policy-oriented
balancing test for standing determinations under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. The test balances the opposing policy interests in
light of the facts the case presents. The Ninth Circuit, in apply-
ing the test, correctly concluded that an employee who was uni-
laterally discharged by his employer as a means of effectuating
an anticompetitive scheme has standing under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. The Ostrofe decision, however, leaves unanswered
questions pertaining to the part foreseeability and "remoteness"
will play in future standing determinations. Subsequent deci-
sions should eliminate this unfortunate ambiguity in the court's
opinion, and thus help to advance the balancing test to attain a
more prominent role in standing determinations.
J. Michael Naughton, Jr.
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